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WASHINGTON CASE LAW- 1958
Presented below is the sixth annual Survey of Washington Case
Law. The articles in this survey issue have been written by secondyear students as a part of their program to attain status as nominees
to the Law Review. The second-year students were guided in their
work by third-year students on the staff of the Law Review and by
various members of the law school faculty.
The case survey issue does not represent an attempt to discuss every
Washington case decided in 1958. Rather, its purpose is to point out
those cases which, in the opinion of the Editorial Board, constitute
substantial additions to the body of law in Washington.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Revocation of License to Practice Dentistry-Scope of Review.
The case of In re Flynn involves an appeal from administrative
action to revoke a license to practice dentistry. Dr. Flynn was found
guilty of unprofessional conduct by an administrative hearing board.

The board found he employed an unlicensed dentist to perform work
on the teeth of one his patients in violation of RCW 18.32.230 and
RCW 18.32.350.2 The director of licenses issued an order revoking
1 152 Wash. Dec. 519, 328 P.2d 150 (1958).

2 RCW 18.32.230 gives authority to the director of licenses to revoke or suspend the
license of any dentist for obtaining or seeking to obtain a practice or money fraudulently
or for any other improper, unprofessional, or dishonorable conduct in the practice of
dentistry, or is convicted of a felony, or when the licensee if [is] found guilty of any
of the following acts or offenses: ...
(5) Employing, procuring, inducing, aiding or abetting a person not
licensed or registered as a dentist to engage in the practice of dentistry. ..
(7) Professional connection or association with, or lending his name to
another for the illegal practice of dentistry by another, or professional connection or association with any person, firm, or corporation holding himself,
themselves, or itself out in any manner contrary to this chapter.
RCW 18.32.350 provides, in part, that the employment of an unlicensed person or
dentist as an operator constitutes "improper, unprofessional, and dishonorable conduct."
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Dr. Flynn's license to practice dentistry.' On appeal to the superior
court, the director's action was affirmed. The trial judge noted that,
although the penalty seemed unduly severe, the acts complained of
were supported by evidence in the record, and he did not believe he
had any authority to do other than affirm the revocation.
The supreme court reversed the decision and remanded the case to
the director of licenses for the imposition of an appropriate disciplinary penalty.
The majority based its opinion on the argument in Schware v. Board
of Bar Examiners.4 The Supreme Court of the United States there
held that:
A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from any
other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due
Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment....
A State can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral
character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the
bar, but any qualification must have a rational connection with the
applicant'sfitness or capacity to practice law.5 (Emphasis added.)

In the Schware case, an attorney had been denied application to
take a state bar examination on the ground that his past membership
in the Communist party, prior arrest record, and use of aliases evinced
substantial doubt as to his good moral character. The United States
Supreme Court held that there was no basis for such doubt, since these
acts occurred fifteen years prior to his application to take the examination, and all evidence showed his present character within recent years
was and had been excellent. The Court further stated that the nature
of the offense which the applicant has committed must be taken into
account to determine whether the person's character is good.'
3 RCW

18.32.270 provides:

The revocation or suspension of a license shall be in writing signed by the

director, stating the grounds upon which such order is based and the

aggrieved person shall have the right to appeal from such order within
fifteen days after a copy thereof is served upon him, to the superior court of
Thurston county, which shall hear the matter de novo. In such appeal the
entire record shall be certified by the director to the court, and the review
on appeal shall be confined to the evidence adduced at the hearing before
the director.
4 353 U.S. 232 (1957). In re Flynn was handed down in July, 1958. In August a
report of the Conference of Chief Justices of state courts was published, criticizing the
action of the United States Supreme Court in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners.
The report stated that such decisions as the Schware case represented an infringement
on the states' power and freedom to select their own bars composed of attorneys of

good character.

CONFERENCE OF CRIEF JusTICEs, REPORT OF THE COmmiTTEE ON FED-

ERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIPS AS AFFEcTED BY JuDIcIAL D~cisIoNs (1958).
5353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957).
353 U.S. 232, 243 (1957).
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In like manner, the Washington supreme court found that inadvetently employing a dentist who 1) was a graduate of an accredited
dental school, 2) was licensed in at least one other state, although
not in Washington, and 3) had previously been employed by the state
itself (at Firland Sanitorium, Seattle) did not indicate "a state of
mind which should be characterized as such untrustworthiness so as
to constitute a 'valid reason' for revoking his license and tossing him
out of his profession." 7
To assess a penalty as drastic as revocation of a professional license,
it is not enough for the administrative board to find a bare violation
of the statute in its literal wording. There must be some "rational
connection" with the ability and fitness to practice the profession and
the punishment. To find such "rational connection" necessitates going
beyond the mere fact that the particular act defined an unprofessional
conduct was done. There must be evidence of something more that
will constitute a "valid reason" for denying a means of livelihood. To
do otherwise does not meet constitutional due process standards.'
The dissenting opinion suggests an inconsistency in the majority's
reasoning. Since the court remanded the action for appropriate penalty, it admits there is some rational basis for disciplinary action.
How can this be reconciled with the statement by the majority that
there is no rational connection between the statutory violation and
ability to practice? Apparently the majority meant there was no
rational connection between the violation and this particularly severe
penalty, i.e., revocation, which implies an unfitness for practice.
The conflict between the majority and minority opinions in In re
Flynn again directs attention to the struggle courts have with the
problem of the scope of judicial review.9 It would seem that a determination of whether a dentist is "fit" to practice or is not requires
intimate and specialized knowledge of the field of dentistry and its
professional obligations. The appropriate penalty or disciplinary
action for misconduct ordinarily should be left to the discretion of the
administrative board established by statute.
Perhaps the court would have had much less difficulty with this
case had the administrative board stated in more detail the grounds
on which the penalty was assessed. Absent such an explanation
It re Flynn, 152 Wash. Dec. 519, 524, 328 P.2d 150, 154 (1958).
1 152 Wash. Dec. 519, 522-523, 328 P.2d 150, 153 (1958) ; cf. it re Kindschi, 151
Wash. Dec. 466, 319 P.2d 824 (1958).
11See Peck, The Scope of Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Washington,
7

33 WASH. L. REv. 55 (1958).
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grounded on the standards of professional competence, it appears
that the administrative determination rested on a conclusion that, as
a matter of statutory construction, violation of the statute per se
required revocation of a license. It is clear that the court, which had
no reason to defer to an administrative view on problems of statutory
construction, reached a contrary conclusion.
It is to be noted that the court itself did not assess a penalty in lieu
of that of the director of licenses, but remanded the case to the
director for the appropriate disciplinary action. Thus the court stated
it was not substituting its own judgment for that of the director."
Had the board expressly stated in its findings what professional
standard a dentist is expected to meet and clearly indicated how, in
terms of professional standards, such a violation established that the
dentist was unfit for practice, it is quite possible that the court might
have affirmed the director's action of revocation." The Washington
supreme court apparently will uphold the statutory authority of an
administrative body to assess an appropriate penalty, so long as there
is a demonstrated rational connection between misconduct and the
ability to practice the profession.
A second and important question involved in In re Flynn was
whether the practice of dentistry should be viewed as a constitution2
ally protected right or an unprotected privilege. In re Harmon,"
a
recent case relied on by the dissenting judges, also involved the revocation of a dentist's license by administrative action. The primary issue
on appeal in the Harmon case was whether, on appeal of an administrative action, the superior court's jurisdiction was limited to review
of the record for determination if the action was arbitrary, capricious,
or contrary to law." The court in the Harmon case held that the
10 This action was sharply criticized by the dissenting judges as doing indirectly
what the court said it could not do directly. The court can keep remanding the case
until the director's penalty is "appropriate" in the eyes of the court.
11 In SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1942), the SEC disapproved a reorganization plan of a public utility holding company that would have allowed considerable
voting control to be held by corporate managers. The grounds of the Commission's
decision rested on the "fiduciary duty" of fair dealing required of corporate managers
and upon "equitable principles," by reason of which the Commission could not approve
the organization plan. The Supreme Court remanded with instructions that the Commission clearly indicate adequate grounds for its decision. The case came to the
Supreme Court a second time in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). This
time the identical action of the Commission was affirmed. The grounds for that action
by the SEC were extensively stated, the theory underlying its action no longer vague
and indecisive. The Commission in effect established itself as being experienced in
reorganization matters and clearly explained under the facts of the case the reasons
behind its decision.
12152 Wash. Dec. 81, 323 P.2d 653 (1958).
1Household Finance Corp. v. State, 40 Wn,2d 451, 244 P.2d 260 (1952).
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superior court was so limited and affirmed the director's action. The
difference between the Harmon case and In re Flynn lies in the fact
that the only assignment of error in the Harmon case was that the
hearing de novo as provided in RCW 18.23.270" was an insufficient
review and divested the appellant of a valuable property right without due process of law. It was not contended on appeal that the action
taken by the director of licenses was arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by the evidence.
In the Flynn case the appeal was predicated on the allegation that
the penalty assessed by the director in this particular instance was
arbitrary and capricious. The right to administer such a penalty
under the appropriatecircumstances was not challenged.
The court in the Harmon case also stated that the "privilege of
practicing dentistry is subject to regulation under the police power of
the state." " The dissenting judges in In re Flynn relied strongly
upon this point, saying flatly that the license to practice dentistry is
a privilege and not a property right, and thus not subject to the due
process standard. The majority neatly parried the property right or
privilege argument, citing with approval the statement by the Court
0 that there need be no disin Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners"
cussion of whether law practice is a privilege or a right. "Regardless
of how the State's grant of permission to engage in this occupation is
characterized,it is sufficient to say that a person cannot be prevented
from practicing except for valid reasons."" The court further stated
that "due process considerations apply in the field of licensing which
involves, at the very least, quasi-property rights.""8 Thus the Washington court in the Flynn case avoided determination of the licensing
problem with a mechanical technique in which labels assume controlling importance. It remains to be seen if the court will wholly
abandon the right-privilege concept which it has used in other licensing
19
cases.
PHiLip B. WILSON
14 See note 3, supra.

15 152 Wash. Dec. 81, 82, 232 P.2d 653, 655 (1958).
10353

U.S. 232 (1957).

17 In re Flynn, 152 Wash. Dec. 519, 522, 238 P.2d 150, 153 (1958), quoting Schware

v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 n.5 (1957). See also EX parte Garland,
71 U.S. 366 (1867).
18 152 Wash. Dec. 519, 521, 238 P.2d 150, 152 n.2 (1958).
19 State ex re. Puyallup v. Superior Court, 50 Wah 650, 97 Pac. 778 (1908)

(liquor license); State ex ret. Aberdeen v. Superior Court, 44 Wash. 526, 87 Nc. 818
(1906) (liquor); Bungalow Amusement Co. v. Seattle, 148 Wash. 485, 269 Pac. 1043
(1928) (dance hall).

